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Encrypted traffic poses new and unique challenges for 
network operators because information that is useful or 
necessary for management purposes is not accessible 
anymore. This paper examines proposed approaches to 
provide end-to-end encryption as well as ways to provide 
the access to the needed information for network 
management. The two main approaches we consider are  
1. extending and adapting a widely deployed protocol 
such as TLS, so that information necessary for 
network management can be obtained; and 
2. introducing a new protocol layer, such as PLUS, that 
contains the necessary information outside of the 
encrypted payload.  
In this paper we discuss different aspects of these 
approaches in order to give recommendations for future 
work and suggest to raise awareness by establishing 
venues where discussions between interested parties can 
take place.  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The original trust model, adopted by the Internet, considered 
it acceptable to use clear text communications for end-to-end 
communications. However, the need for communications 
security, at least in parts of the end-to-end communication, 
arose quickly. As the Internet evolved to support sensitive day- 
to-day operations (i.e. banking, private communications, etc.), 
communications security was the only means to protect the 
end-to-end communication from eavesdropping (sniffing) or 
modification (Man-in- the-middle (MITM) attacks). This 
protection is typically achieved by using cryptographic 
protocols like TLS [1, 2, 3], or the use of encrypted tunnels. The 
concerns are greater when radio transmission can be easily 
intercepted. For example, the impact of the everyday scenario 
using WiFi networks is reasoned in [4]. In addition, RFC 7258 
concludes a consensus in the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), that the pervasive use of monitoring of Internet traffic 
has to be considered an attack [5]. 
During its evolution, and in order to cover specific needs, 
intermediate devices that inspect or even modify end-to-end 
traffic have been introduced and accepted in the Internet. Such 
intermediate nodes interacting with the end-to-end traffic are 
known as middleboxes. One example middlebox is the 
Network Address Translator (NAT) defined in RFC1631 [6] 
needed to overcome the depletion of the IPv4 address space 
until IPv6 is fully deployed. Another example is Network 
Address Translation-Protocol Translation (NAT-PT) [7] as a 
transition mechanism to accelerate IPv6 deployment. Too 
guarantee that end-to- end encryption is compatible with these 
mechanisms, the IETF later produced compatibility 
requirement documents [8, 9]. 
Since middleboxes have established themselves as a mean to 
provide in-network services, there has been extensive research 
on how they can interact in an orderly manner with endpoints 
in end-to-end encrypted communications and different 
protocols have been developed to implement this interaction. 
While middlebox interaction is still a debated topic in the 
IETF, European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) has started work on standardising it. 
The MAMI project organised the MAMI Management and 
Measurement Summit (M3S) that examined the challenges of 
pervasive encryption on network management in the Internet. 
The workshop report [10] concludes that despite encryption, 
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independent measurability of the Internet should be provided 
and that the trend should be to introduce middlebox 
transparency in order to replace transparent middleboxes. 
The impact of pervasive encryption on network operations is 
discussed in [11]. This notes that there are legitimate situations 
where decryption is needed. One such situation is mitigation 
of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, where it is desirable to 
protect and favour legitimate traffic and block illegitimate 
traffic. Another is the use of admission control techniques to 
Differentiated Services [12, 13]-enabled networks as a way to 
map traffic flows to network treatment most favourable to 
them (for example, optimised treatment of real-time traffic 
[14]). [15] examines the impact of encryption on network 
operations and points out that there will always be trade-offs 
between what parts of the communication are encrypted and 
the ability to operate and maintain the Internet as well as to 
develop transport protocols to keep up with the technological 
evolution. In addition, as noted in [11], there is a mandate for 
operators to implement lawful intercept to assist agencies in 
crime prevention. Finally, there are scenarios, such as providing 
Internet access in rural areas using satellite access, where 
standard TCP would achieve very low throughput. In this case, 
highly invasive techniques are used such as TCP transparent 
proxies or asymmetric TCP acceleration can have significant 
benefit. These techniques are not compatible with end-to-end 
encryption [16]. 
Future evolutions where access control techniques or the lack 
of them will be critical include Deterministic Networking [17]. 
In the absence of techniques that enable identify special traffic 
classes in the Internet (including the use of specialised 
middleboxes), the use cases currently considered by the 
Working Group (WG) [18] will lead to the creation of parallel, 
isolated Internets to support them.
The GSMA, through its Internet Working Group, has 
considered the implications of a new Internet stack in the 
current network management practices of mobile network 
operators. Two white papers have been published, analyzing the 
specific requirements of radio access, the current techniques in 
use to address these requirements, and the impact of the 
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Internet stack evolution on these techniques. The documents 
recommend further investigation, with the goals of assessing 
the technologies analyzed and to contribute towards 
standardizing solutions. In addition, a workshop between the 
GSMA and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) help in 
September, 2105 discussed the implications of bandwidth 
optimisation tools for mobile networks and pervasive 
encryption [19]. [20] describes approaches allowing operators 
to manage network data that is increasingly encrypted, and 
delivered via new protocols and congestion-control algorithms. 
It also covers non-technical considerations, which include 
regulation and security. The document provides a set of 
recommendations for the coming 5G era, where there is 
expected to be a radical increase in the range of traffic types, 
and overall load placed on the network. Taking these 
approaches as a starting point, MAMI has conducted a set of 
experiments to demonstrate the usefulness of providing 
information about a flow crossing a 5G networks [21] that is 
either loss or latency tolerant. 
Once middlebox interaction is assumed to take place, another 
question arises: how are the the end- points to be notified that 
cooperating middleboxes operate on the path through a 
domain. This can be accomplished by either out-of-band 
configuration, maintaining Network Operator information 
base that would need to be passed to the endpoints by device 
configuration protocols such as Dynamic Host Con- figuration 
Protocol (DHCP) or by another mean, e.g. Domain Name 
Service (DNS). Another alternative explored by developers is 
to provide in-band device discovery, i.e. where a cooperating 
middlebox signals its presence and capabilities during the 
handshake phase (e.g., e [22]). 
Depending on the mindset, middlebox cooperation can be 
approached from an evolutionary point of view in different 
ways, i.e. whether to upgrade existing protocols, whether to 
add new features, caring or not about backwards compatibility, 
or the addition of new layers to the protocol stack that can 
carry the additional information that can be utilised to support 
middlebox cooperation. 
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TLS-based Approaches  
TLS provides encrypted end-to-end communications, and does 
not not allow for in-path devices to interact with the traffic. 
Acknowledging that privacy of communications is important 
and should be preserved, a number of in-network services have 
evolved during the last years, allowing, e.g. for traffic 
optimisation, allowing Internet connectivity to expand to 
regions where network deployment is challenging or enhancing 
the end users’ QoE, traffic monitoring for parental protection, 
etc. These services are normally provided by Network 
Operators using middleboxes. In this section, we look at 
different, proposed extensions or additions to TLS to are 
designed to enable middleboxes cooperation. 
• Multi-context TLS   
Multi-context TLS (mcTLS) [23, 24] extends version 1.2 of TLS. 
It allows endpoints to identify trusted middleboxes that will 
interact with the traffic. It is based on the following principles: 
1. both endpoints need to explicitly approve each middlebox; 2. 
each middlebox only interacts with the parts of the traffic it 
needs to do its job; 3. the identity of each middlebox can be 
verified by the endpoints; and 4. no custom root certificates 
need to be installed by users. The interaction with the traffic is 
fine-grained. The use of read or write keys on specific portions 
of the traffic, can be used to detect changes introduced by 
external third parties or by middleboxes with read-only 
privileges. Key distribution can be done by classical IP 
configuration mechanisms like DHCP or DNS. 
The main drawback of mcTLS is that it is modified version of 
TLS v1.2 that needs endpoints to implement it. In addition, 
[25] casts a shadow of doubt in some security aspects of 
mcTLS. 
• Middlebox Secutiry Protocol    
ETSI is working in its Technical Committee on Cyber-security 
(TC CYBER) on the Middlebox Secutiry Protocol (MSP) [26], 
which is derived from mcTLS. In addition to reading and 
modifying the stream, MSP provides for auditable insertions 
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and deletions as well as middlebox discovery. In addition, MSP 
addresses vulnerabilities of mcTLS(as, e.g. [25]). 
• Middle-box TLS 
Middle-box TLS (mbTLS) [27] follows the same line of mcTLS 
in that it provides for interaction with middleboxes. However, 
the approach is broader, because it considers both Network 
and application layer middleboxes, as well as with application-
layer delegates like Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). It is 
immediately deployable on legacy TLS endpoints and, since it 
uses standard TLS v1.2 handshake with some additional 
extensions and records, it will traverse current firewall setups. 
In addition to user and out-of-band configuration, mbTLS 
provides for middleboxes to be discovered in-band. Regarding 
the handling of multi-party settings, mbTLS guarantees that 
the chain of middleboxes between two endpoints is visited in a 
specified order, hides modifications on traffic to outside 
observers and provides attestation facilities to endpoints 
regarding the Software running in middleboxes. 
Regarding TLS 1.3, the authors foresee that the handshake can 
mbTLS can be evolved to support it with minor modifications 
and a potential delay in the Finished handshake of an 
additional round-trip. 
• EFGH   
EFGH is a pluggable extension to the TLS protocol that allows 
middleboxes to be explicitly introduced in the client-server 
path without affecting the security guarantees of the end-to-
end channel. The trusted middlebox is granted access to a 
subset of the traffic that the principals have agreed upon. The 
capability is negotiated between the principals through the 
TLS handshake extension mechanism. Upon completion of the 
handshake, and if both parties support EFGH, a one round-
trip message exchange is required for key establishment 
between the client, the server and the proxy. EFGH strongly 
stresses the end-to-end trust relationship integrity and allows 
the client and server to selectively expose exchanged traffic to 
trusted intermediaries via a modified TLS record format. 
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Path Layer UDP Substrate (PLUS)   
The Path Layer UDP Substrate (PLUS) [28] follows a different 
approach by introducing a path layer between the IP layer and 
the encrypted upper layer protocols for signaling between 
endpoints and middleboxes while leaving the upper layer 
encryption unimpaired. The protocol is designed to support 
basic stateful in-network functionality (i.e. network state 
maintenance and measurement). In addition, PLUS also 
provides the possibility of adding extensions through so-called 
Path Communication Functions (PCFs) to provide a flexible 
and (transport-)protocol-independent mechanisms which also 
allows on-path devices to communicate with end-points. For 
information from the end-points to the network the protection 
context of the upper layer protocol is used to ensure integrity 
of information that are not meant to be alter by the network. 
PLUS was presented in a Birds-of-a-Feather (BOF) session at 
the IETF 96 in Berlin [29]. A BoF is a meeting that brings 
together people to discuss a new proposal. The meeting was 
well-attended with many people understanding the need for 
this work and showing support for the approach. However, 
privacy and trust concerns were also being discussed, given 
introducing the a path layer explicitly acknowledges changes to 
the Internet model. The outcome of the meeting was 
inconclusive, but the Internet Research Task Force (IETF) has 
since started to explore the research issues associated with the 
broader topic of path aware networking. 
PLUS’s main merits are that it offers signals to perform basic 
network maintenance as well as providing functionality for 
interacting with middleboxes. However, as PLUS is a new 
separate protocol that needs to be introduced below a 
transport protocols, deployment depends on the adoption at 
the endpoint which ideally would happen in conjunction which 
new protocols that are under development in the IETF. 
Analysis and Recommendations   
The different middlebox cooperation mechanisms presented 
above have different requirements with regard to the trust 
relationships and the coordination between the different 
elements in the communications path. In addition, they exhibit 
a different behaviour when inserted in the path and, last but 
not least, require different modifications to a state-of-the-art 
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deployment. For an in-depth analysis of some mechanisms to 
expand TLS to cope with middleboxes, good work is provided 
by [30] (cf. Table 1, page 45). 
Table 1 provides a different approach focusing on deployment 
challenges and the underlying coordination and cryptographic 
exchange mechanisms needed. First, it should be noted that all 
TLS-based mechanisms aim at enabling content inspection or 
even modifications of some or all data, while PLUS is an 
proposal for explicit signalling of additional information that 
support in-network functions. As such PLUS does require any 
cryptographic relationship with any middlebox, while most of 
the other proposals do. The TLS-based approaches different in 
how cooperation is negotiated and who needs to agree or will 
be aware of the middlebox(es). Respectively, some deployment 
scenarios need either both endpoints to upgrade and support 
the new mechanism or protocol, while in other cases only one 
endpoint can communicate with an enabled middlebox. 
Based on this summary and on the discussion of the different 
approaches in Sections 3.2 and 3.1, we recommend to take the 
following considerations into account when designing 
mechanisms for encrypted traffic to interact with middleboxes: 
1. end-to-end integrity of the communications must be 
guaranteed, 
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2. only strictly required information should be exposed and 
exclusively to the middleboxes that needs it, 
3. the introduction of new features is better accepted if done 
in an evolutionary way (i.e. backward- compatible 
deployments), and 
4. support mechanism needed for deployment should be 
minimised (i.e. avoid depending on additional configuration 
being managed by DHCP, DNS, etc.). 
A set of seemingly conflicting trends have started to evolve in 
parallel. On the one hand, middleboxes have sought to provide 
in-network services that have been widely deployed as a 
fundamental component of the (IP) infrastructure, while on 
the other hand, the end-to-end connections using the IP 
infrastrcuture is increasingly encrypted for various legitimate 
reasons. These two trends are set to collide, because 
middleboxes rely upon information that becomes hidden from 
them when encryption is used. 
Legal requirements (e.g. lawful intercept) and upcoming 
standardisation may force Network Operators deployment of 
specific middlebox cooperation mechanisms. However, a Zero-
day approach has become unthinkable, and therefore a solution 
that can cooperate with legacy or encryption-only deployments 
needs to be considered. 
Middlebox cooperation in encrypted end-to-end 
communications is a topic that has come to polarise the 
community. Acknowledging legitimate privacy concerns while 
at the same time understanding the need for mechanisms to 
support operation of the Internet needs to pave the way for an 
informed discussion among stakeholders in a constructive 
environment and without prejudices. With the precedent of 
the successful MAMI Management and Measurement Summit 
(M3S) and taking the example of the Mutually Agreed Norms 
for Routing Security (MANRS) initiative [31] fostered by the 
Internet Society (ISOC), there is a need for a meeting point 
where actors can discuss and agree on basic principles, such as 
the exposed information and its semantics for middlebox 
cooperation. A one-sided approach from any organisation or 
interest group is expected to be counterproductive.  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